Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
... 10 April 2003, North Korea's Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official ... Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Turns 40 Today in 2008. ...
en.wikipedia.org

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Information from Answers.com
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty International agreement intended to prevent the spread of nuclear technology ... Law Encyclopedia: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ...
www.answers.com

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance | Arms Control ...
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. U.S., NK Agree on Draft Verification Plan ... The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in March ...
www.armscontrol.org

The Nuclear Vault: Resources from the Nuclear Weapons Documentation Project
40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Special Collection ... Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nonproliferation Program ...
www.gwu.edu

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) | Arms Control Association
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Latest ACA Resources. Nuclear Nonproliferation ... Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Change Nuclear Weapons Policy? Yes, We Can. ...
www.armscontrol.org

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)
gations to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation ... Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-The vast majority of states called ...
www.nti.org

The Nuclear Vault: 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
... that produced the historic Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 40 ... 2. Fred Kaplan, "The Real Nuclear Option: The Nonproliferation Treaty is a Mess. ...
www.gwu.edu

National Nuclear Security Administration - Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Arms Reduction Treaties. 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation ... The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ...
nnsa.energy.gov

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Achievements and Shortcomings
volume entitled, "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Proposals for ... George Bunn, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems, ...
www.veteransforamerica.org

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Strengths and Gaps Leonard Weiss
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),1 despite the confused philosophy of ... 1. "Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," opened for signature 1 ...
www.fas.org

Warning: mkdir() [function.mkdir]: Permission denied in /home/webs/affiliatelib2/CacheManager.php on line 12

Warning: mkdir() [function.mkdir]: No such file or directory in /home/webs/affiliatelib2/CacheManager.php on line 12

Warning: fopen(/home/templatecore2cache//*cluesnet.com/69/69f990b9cfc454fd46fe52469d756770aa5387c5.tc2cache) [function.fopen]: failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/webs/affiliatelib2/CacheManager.php on line 130

Warning: fwrite(): supplied argument is not a valid stream resource in /home/webs/affiliatelib2/CacheManager.php on line 131

Warning: fclose(): supplied argument is not a valid stream resource in /home/webs/affiliatelib2/CacheManager.php on line 132

{{Treatybox|treaty_name=Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty|colour_scheme=background:orange|image=|caption=14 kiloton atomic explosion, from a 1951 US nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. (Operation Buster-Jangle, Charlie)], 1968, [1970, the [Soviet Union, the United States, and 40 other signatory states.] to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, opened for signature on July 1 1968. There are currently Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty#Parties to the treaty party to the treaty, List of states with nuclear weapons have nuclear weapons: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the People's Republic of China.

Only four nations are not signatories: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. India and Pakistan both possess and have openly tested nuclear bombs. Israel has had a policy of Policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding Nuclear weapons and Israel. North Korea ratified the treaty, violated it, and later withdrew.

The treaty was proposed by Republic of Ireland, and Finland was the first to sign. The signing parties decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions upon meeting in New York City on May 11, 1995. The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" appears nowhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as having three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and Nuclear power.Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, 26 April 2004, United Nations, New York, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, furnished by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations (indonesiamission-ny.org)

Treaty pillars First pillar: non-proliferation Five states are recognized by the NPT as nuclear weapon states (NWS): France (signed 1992), the People's Republic of China (1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by Russia), the United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968). The U.S., UK, and Soviet Union were the only states openly possessing such weapons among the original ratifiers of the treaty, which entered into force in 1970. These five nations are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five NWS agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to "receive," "manufacture" or "acquire" nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons" (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article III). This is why the recent US-India nuclear energy deal has come under (legal) controversy as it threatens to undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime exploiting the loophole granted by the nature of Dual-use technology, as has the Russia-Iran uranium deal.

The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The U.S. also had nuclear warheads targeted at North Korea, a non-NWS state, from 1959 until 1991. The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states" UK 'prepared to use nuclear weapons' BBC article dated 20 March, 2002. In January 2006, President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centers. France 'would use nuclear arms', BBC article dated 19 January, 2006 Chirac: Nuclear Response to Terrorism Is Possible, Washington Post article dated 20 January, 2006

Second pillar: disarmament The NPT's preamble contains language affirming the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals. The NPT's Article VI elaborates on the preamble's language, urging all State Parties to the NPT, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

On the one hand, the wording of Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament. Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith."

On the other hand, some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, have interpreted Article VI's language as being anything but vague. In their view, Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states have failed to meet their obligation. Some government delegations to the Conference on Disarmament have tabled proposals for a complete and universal disarmament, but no disarmament treaty has emerged from these proposals needed. Critics of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states sometimes argue that what they view as the failure of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, especially in the post-Cold War era, has angered some non-nuclear-weapon NPT signatories of the NPT. Such failure, these critics add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear arsenals.

Third pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy Since very few of the nuclear weapons states and states nuclear power are willing to completely abandon possession of nuclear fuel, the third pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

Article IV of the NPT has been interpreted by some states to grant them a right to uranium enrichment for fuel reasons, but seems to be a major loophole, since there are no significant legal barriers distinguishing between a state's capability to enrich uranium for reactor fuel and the ability to enrich to a level that can be used in nuclear weapons (see dual-use technology). The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II" (the basic nonproliferation obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the Treaty). As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Controversy can arise when a state claims it is pursuing enrichment for peaceful purposes but has no reactors that require enriched uranium fuel, as is the case in North Korea and Iran. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles heel" of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As of 2007 13 states have an enrichment capability.

Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons. However, North Korea violated The DPRK never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations, which are tantamount to violations of NPT Article III. See http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/dprk.pdf and http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/med-advise_048.shtml and later withdrew from the NPT and tested a nuclear device, Iran has been accused of seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability, and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December 2003. In some regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear regulatory body, has said that if they wanted to, forty states could develop nuclear bombs.

Key articles Article I:U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (nawcwpns.navy.mil) Treaty On Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Each nuclear-weapons state (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices.

Article II: Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices; and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture.

Article III: Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities and to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article VI. The states undertake to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", and towards a "Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Article X. Establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving 3 months' notice. It also establishes the duration of the Treaty (25 years before 1995 Extension Initiative).

History The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was recognized that the cold war deterrent relationship between just the United States and Soviet Union was fragile. More nuclear players reduced security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accident or unauthorized use, or through the escalation of a small nuclear conflict.

The treaty was proposed by Ireland, and opened for signature in 1968, Finland was the first to sign. By 1992 all five then-declared nuclear powers had signed the treaty, and the treaty was renewed in 1995 (and followed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996). Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs. South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, allegedly with the assistance of Israel in the 70s, and Vela Incident a nuclear test in the Atlantic ocean in 1979, but has since renounced its nuclear program and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nuclear arsenal. Several former Soviet Republics destroyed or transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.

United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing At the time the treaty was being negotiated, NATO had in place secret Nuclear sharing agreements whereby the United States provided nuclear weapons to be deployed by, and stored in, other NATO states. Some argue this is an act of proliferation violating Articles I and II of the treaty. A counter-argument is that the U.S. controlled the weapons in storage within the NATO states, and that no transfer of the weapons or control over them was intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of the NPT. These agreements were disclosed to a few of the states, including the Soviet Union, negotiating the treaty, but most of the states that signed the NPT in 1968 would not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time Otfried Nassauer, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (ieer.org), Science for Democratic Action Volume 9 Number 3, May 2001, Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal?.

As of 2005, it is estimated that the United States still provides about 180 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under these NATO agreements Hans M. Kristensen, National Resources Defence Council (nrdc.org), February 2006, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning. Many states, and the Non-Aligned Movement, now argue this violates Articles I and II of the treaty, and are applying diplomatic pressure to terminate these agreements. They point out that the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practice handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs, and non-U.S. warplanes have been adapted to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs which must have involved the transfer of some technical nuclear weapons information. NATO believes its "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political" NATO (nato.int), NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment.

India, Pakistan, and Israel Three states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—have declined to sign the treaty. India and Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has made a statement that some interpret as tacitly admitting that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, breaking a long-standing policy of official denial, though it is not Israel and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons (see List of countries with nuclear weapons). These countries argue that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid.

India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and have detonated nuclear devices in tests, India having Smiling Buddha in 1974 and Pakistan following suit in 1998 in response to Pokhran-II. India is estimated to have enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads. Pakistan reportedly has 60. India is one of the few countries to have a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons. The main reason quoted by India for not signing NPT and for possessing nuclear weapons is that China, with which it has fought war in 1962 and has long standing border dispute, is one of the "nuclear haves".

According to leaked intelligence, Israel has been developing nuclear weapons at its Dimona site in the Negev since 1958, and many nonproliferation analysts like David Albright estimate that Israel may have stockpiled between 100 to 200 warheads using the plutonium reprocessed from Dimona. The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny possession of nuclear weapons, although this is now regarded as an open secret after Israeli low level nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu—later apprehended and jailed by Israel—revealed the program to the United Kingdom The Sunday Times (UK) in 1986.

In early March of 2006, India and the United States finalized a deal, having critics in both countries, to provide India with US civilian nuclear technology. Proponents of the deal note that India will now classify 14 of its 22 nuclear facilities as being for civilian use, and thus open to inspection. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the IAEA at the time, welcomed the deal by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation regime".However, attempts made by Pakistan to sign a similar agreement have been thwarted by the U.S. as well as the international community. The argument put forth is that Pakistan lacks the same energy requirements, and that the track record of Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to have any sort of nuclear deal in the near future. BBC (bbc.co.uk), 2 March 2006, US and India seal nuclear accord

In December 2006, United States Congress approved the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act that was cemented during President Bush's visit to India earlier in the year. The legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India. Despite its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India was granted these transactions on the basis of its clean proliferation record, and India's unusually high need for energy fueled by its rapid industrialization and a billion-plus population.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers with very narrow exceptions for India, Pakistan, and Israel, since none of the three has full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all its nuclear activities. The NSG is prepared to consider a broad exception for India, but is awaiting the conclusion of negotiations on an agreement for cooperation between the United States and India and a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency before making a decision on such an exception. Several countries, including France, Russia and Australia, are discussing possible nuclear cooperation with India in case of such an exception to the NSG Guidelines.

North Korea North Korea ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985, but gave notice of withdrawal from the treaty on January 10, 2003 following U.S. allegations that it had started an illegal enriched uranium weapons program, and the U.S. subsequently stopping fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework which had resolved plutonium weapons issues in 1994 Korean News Service, Tokyo (kcna.co.jp), 10 January 2003, Statement of DPRK Government on its withdrawal from NPT. The withdrawal became effective April 10, 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty.Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (wagingpeace.org), 10 April 2003, North Korea’s Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official North Korea had once before announced withdrawal, on March 12, 1993, but suspended that notice before it came into effect.International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea.org), May 2003, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards

On February 10, 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and pulled out of the six-party talks hosted by China to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. "We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured nuclear arms for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK People's Republic of Korea," a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said regarding the issueKorean News Service, Tokyo (kcna.co.jp), February 2005, DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period. Six-party talks resumed in July 2005.

On September 19, 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord. Under the accord, North Korea would scrap all of its existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities, rejoin the NPT, and readmit IAEA inspectors. The difficult issue of the supply of light water reactors to replace North Korea's Yongbyon Reactors, as per the 1994 Agreed Framework, was left to be resolved in future discussionsJoseph Khan, New York Times (nytimes.com), 19 September 2005, North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts. On the next day North Korea reiterated its known view that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the NPT Agence France Presse, 2006, N.Korea raises stakes on nuclear deal with reactor demand, furnished by Media Corp News (channelnewsasia.com), 20 September 2005.

On October 2, 2006, the North Korean foreign minister announced that his country was planning to conduct a nuclear test "in the future", although it did not state when.BBC (news.bbc.co.uk), 3 October 2006, N Korea 'to conduct nuclear test' On Monday, October 9, 2006 at 01:35:27 (UTC) the United States Geological Survey detected a magnitude 4.2 Seismology 70 km (45 miles) north of Kimchaek, North Korea indicating a nuclear test. The North Korean government announced shortly afterward that they had completed 2006 North Korean nuclear test of a nuclear fission device.

In 2007 reports from Washington suggested that the 2002 CIA reports that North Korea was developing an enriched uranium weapons program, which led to North Korea leaving the NPT, had overstated or misread the intelligence.

Iran Iran is a signatory state of the NPT and has recently (as of 2006) resumed development of a uranium enrichment program. The Iranian government asserts that this enrichment program is part of its civilian nuclear energy program, which is permitted under Article IV of the NPT. However, Iran violated its NPT safeguards agreement by pursuing uranium enrichment in secret, after which the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution ordering Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activity. UN Security Council Resolution 1737 The United States and some members of the European Union have accused Iran of using this program to help covertly develop nuclear weapons, which would be in violation of article II of the NPT. Iran remains under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In November 2003 International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an extended period failed to meet with its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Director General of the IAEA, 10 November 2003, GOV/2003/75 After nearly two years of diplomatic efforts led by France, Germany and the UK, in September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found that these failures constituted non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement, not the NPT itself. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Resolution, 24 September 2005, GOV/2005/77 The United States contends on this basis that Iran violated Article II as well as Article III of the NPT. Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, August 30, 2005

South Africa South Africa also deserves a special mention as the only country that developed nuclear weapons themselves (as opposed to those of Kazakhstan and other ex-Soviet states that inherited them from the former USSR) and fully disarmed under the NPT.

During the days of apartheid, the white South African government developed a deep fear of both a black uprising and the threat of communism. This led to the development of a secret nuclear weapons program as an ultimate deterrent. South Africa has a large supply of uranium, which is mined in the country's gold mines. The government built a nuclear research facility at Pelindaba near Pretoria where uranium was enriched to fuel grade for the nuclear power plant at Koeberg as well as weapon grade for bomb production.

In 1991, after international pressure and when a change of government was imminent, South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1993, the then president Frederik Willem de Klerk openly admitted that the country had developed a limited nuclear weapon capability. These weapons were subsequently dismantled prior to accession to the NPT. South Africa then opened itself up to IAEA for inspection. In 1994 the IAEA completed its work and declared that the country had fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program.

Libya Libya signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in October of 2003 was caught in violation of it when the United States intercepted the illegal transport of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts sent from Malaysia as part of A. Q. Khan's proliferation ring). Libya then admitted to possessing an illegal nuclear weapons program in violation of the treaty and simultaneously announced its intention to end it and dismantle all existing weapons of mass destruction to be verified by unconditional inspections.

Leaving the treaty Article X allows a state to leave the treaty if "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country", giving three months' (ninety days') notice. The state is required to give reasons for leaving the NPT in this notice.

NATO states argue that when there is a state of "general war" the treaty no longer applies, effectively allowing the states involved to leave the treaty with no notice. This is a necessary argument to support the NATO nuclear weapons sharing policy, but a troubling one for the logic of the treaty. NATO's argument is based on the phrase "the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war" in the treaty preamble, inserted at the behest of U.S. diplomats, arguing that the treaty would at that point have failed to fulfill its function of prohibiting a general war and thus no longer be binding. Many states do not accept this argument. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty#United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing above.

North Korea has also caused an uproar by its use of this provision of the treaty. Article X.1 only requires a state to give three months' notice in total, and does not provide for other states to question a state's interpretation of "supreme interests of its country". In 1993, North Korea gave notice to withdraw from the NPT. However, after 89 days, North Korea reached agreement with the United States to freeze its nuclear program under the Agreed Framework http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf and "suspended" its withdrawal notice. In October, 2002, the United States accused North Korea of violating the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program, and suspended shipments of heavy fuel oil under that agreement. In response, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors, disabled IAEA equipment, and, on January 10, 2003, announced that it was ending the suspension of its previous NPT withdrawal notification. North Korea said that only one more day's notice was sufficient for withdrawal from the NPT, as it had given 89 days before. The IAEA Board of Governors rejected this interpretation.http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/med-advise_048.shtml. Most countries held that a new three-months withdrawal notice was required, and some questioned whether North Korea's notification met the "extraordinary events" and "supreme interests" requirements of the Treaty. The Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 at the end of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks called for North Korea to "return" to the NPT, implicitly acknowledging that it had withdrawn.

Future The inclusion of (civilian) nuclear power in the July 2005 Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate is politically sensitive, as India, which tested its first atomic bomb in 1974, refuses to sign the NPT. Prior to the announcement of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, on 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush had met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and declared that he would work to change US law and international rules to permit trade in US civilian nuclear technology with India. The Associated Press, 2005, Bush opens energy door to India, furnished by CNN (cnn.com), 18 July 2005 Some, such as British columnist George Monbiot, argue that the U.S.-India nuclear deal, in combination with US attempts to deny Iran (an NPT signatory) civilian nuclear fuel-making technology, may destroy the NPT regime, while others contend that such a move will likely bring India, an NPT non-signatory, under closer international scrutiny.George Monbiot, The Guardian (guardian.co.uk), 2 August 2005, The treaty wreckers

Every five years, there is a Review Conference on the treaty. At the seventh Review Conference in May 2005, there were stark differences between the United States, which wanted the conference to focus on proliferation, especially on its allegations against Iran, and most other countries, who emphasized the lack of serious nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers. The Non-Aligned Movement reiterated their positionSyed Hamid Albar,Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, United Nations (un.org), New York, 2 May 2005, The General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement violates the treaty.

Parties to the treaty {| width=100%| valign=top align=left width=33% |

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
The Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina3
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
People's Republic of China
Republic of China1
Colombia
Comoros
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Republic of the Congo
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia3
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon

| valign=top align=left width=34% |

The Gambia
Georgia (country)
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Holy See (Vatican City)
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Republic of Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
South Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Republic of Macedonia3
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Federated States of Micronesia
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro3
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger

| valign=top align=left width=33% |

Nigeria
North Korea
Norway
Oman
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia2
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
São Tomé and Príncipe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia3
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia3
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen4
Zambia
Zimbabwe

|}

North Korea was a party to the treaty from December 12, 1985 until April 10, 2003.

Notes:

The Republic of China (Taiwan) was an original signatory of the NPT, but was China and the United Nations from the UN in 1971. Though the UN no longer recognizes the ROC, the ROC states it Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction. China joined NPT in 1992 with the following declaration: 'the signing and ratification of the Treaty by the Taiwan authorities in the name of China on 1 July 1968 and 27 January 1970 respectively are illegal and null and void.'

through the Soviet Union.

through Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

through the Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.